The question
After the pandemic, consumers moved from rewarding brands to rationalizing their spending. Private label and discount stores were growing fast, and most consumers already rated them equal or better in quality. Leadership needed to know how to take part in that growth.
What everyone assumed
The common reading was that hard discount is just a cheaper channel, a price threat to be resisted. On that reading, the only possible response was to defend margins.
How we solved it
We sized the packaged food opportunity market by market and mapped every player in the chain, discount chains, retailers, manufacturers and co-packers. The question stopped being how much is lost and became who manufactures for private label, and what they need.
With competitive positioning models we located where the company could compete, which customers to prioritize and which part of its portfolio fit the new channel.
The decision
Instead of defending against the channel, the company decided to enter it with a dual business model, one for traditional private label and one for premium private label, and to test it first with a pilot.
What applies to other companies
When consumers shift regime, it is not only what they buy that changes. Who sells to them changes, and with it, who buys from suppliers.
Growth rarely disappears. It moves. The first decision is to find where it went.